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INTRODUCTION

to Idaho Appellate Rule 34(c) and

Appellant Whitney Bright

or "Ms. Bright") submits this Reply Brief in rebuttal to the arguments and
additional issues raised by Respondents Roman and Natalya Maznik ("Respondents" or
"Mazniks") in Respondents' Brief filed November 22, 2016.

Appellant incorporates her

statements of the course of proceedings and facts in Appellant's Brief herein.
Appellant continues to assert that by definition under Idaho Code § 25-2805(2), both the
dog owner and the owner of the premises on which the animal is housed have a duty for
responsibility resulting from an unprovoked attack by a vicious dog. There is no exception under
the statute for lack of knowledge nor is there a requirement of a prior bite or attack before
liability attaches.

In fact, the statute details the further consequences of what happens on a

"second or subsequent violation" so that it is known that the first sentence of Idaho Code § 252805(2) applies to duties on the first attack of a vicious dog. The District Court erred by finding
that the statute was ambiguous and considered extraneous issues that were outside the clear
language outlining the statutory requirements to impose liability on the owners of the premises.
Appellant further asserts that the District Court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of
the Respondents on Appellant's negligence claim. The factual evidence produced by Appellant
to establish that the Respondents knew or should have known of the vicious tendencies of the
dog constituted a genuine issue of material fact that should have been submitted to a jury.
Determination by summary judgment was inappropriate.
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ARGUMENT
L

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED BY GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT
WHERE GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT WERE PRESENTED BY
APPELLANT.
A.

Summary Judgment was Improper Pursuant to Rule 56(c), Idaho Rules of
Civil Procedure.

Summary judgment is proper if "the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter oflaw." I.R.C.P. 56(c). As detailed in
Respondents' Brief at page 10, the party initially bringing the motion has the burden to prove
that no genuine issues of material fact exist and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Indian Springs LLC v. Indian Springs Land Inv., LLC, 147 Idaho 737, 746, 215 P.3d 457, 466
(2009) (citing Caffertyv. Dep'to/Transp., Div. of Motor Vehicle Servs., 144 Idaho 324,327, 160
P.3d 763, 766 (2007)). After the moving party meets this burden, "the burden shifts to the
nonmoving party to show the existence of a genuine issue of material fact." Asbury Park, LLC v.

Greenbriar Estate Homeowners' Ass'n, Inc., 152 Idaho 338, 343-44, 271 P.3d 1194, 1199-1200
(2012) (quoting Chandler v. Hayden, 147 Idaho 765, 769, 215 P.3d 845, 489 (2009)).

"On

appeal, we exercise free review in determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists
and whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."

Edwards v.

Conchemco, Inc., 111 Idaho 851, 852, 727 P.2d 1279, 1280 (Ct. App. 1986).
B.

As the Party Moving for Summary Judgment, Respondents Failed to Meet
Their Burden to Establish that There Was No Genuine Issue of Material
Fact.
The party moving for summary judgment initially carries the burden to establish
that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that he or she is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. Eliopulos v. Knox, 123 Idaho 400, 404, 848 P.2d
984, 988 (Ct. App. 1992). The burden
met
evidence on an element that the nonmoving party will be required to prove at trial.
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF-5

Dunnickv. Elder, 126 Idaho 308,311,882 P.2d 475,478 (Ct. App. 1994). Such
an absence of evidence may be established either by an affirmative showing with
the moving party's own evidence, or by a review of all the nonrnoving party's
evidence and the contention that such proof of an element is lacking. Heath v.
Honker's Mini-Mart, Inc., 134 Idaho 711, 712, 8 P.3d 1254, 1255 (Ct. App.
2000). Once such an absence of evidence has been established, the burden then
shifts to the party opposing the motion to show, via further depositions, discovery
responses, or affidavits, that there is indeed a genuine issue for trial or to offer a
valid justification for the failure to do so under I.R. C.P. 56( t). Sanders, 125 Idaho
at 847, 846 P.2d at 156.
Boswell v. Steele, 158 Idaho 554, 558-559, 348 P.3d 497, 501 (Ct. App. 2015).

II.

ENTRY OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS IMPROPER.
Respondents cite to the Idaho Supreme Court case, L & W Supply Corporation v.

Chartrand Family Trust, 186 Idaho 738, 40 P.3d 96 (Idaho 2002), to support the position of the

District Court to analyze the various factors involving the reasonableness and public policy
behind I.C. § 25-2805(2) and the legislative history. R. Vol. 1, p. 240 (Memorandum Decision
Upon Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, dated Jul. 17, 2015). In doing so, the District
Court further evaluated genuine issues of material fact in supporting the decision to enter
summary judgment. However, there is a very important procedural distinction between L & W
Supply and the instant case that was not addressed by the Court.

In L & W Supply, both parties to the case filed motions for summary judgment:
When both parties file motions for summary judgment on the same facts, issues,
and theories, essentially the parties stipulate that there is no genuine issue of
material fact that would preclude the court from entering summary judgment.
Daugharty, 134 Idaho at 733, 9 P.3d at 536. When the parties have so stipulated
and when the trier of fact is to be court, rather than a jury, the trial court is free to
arrive at the most probable inferences based upon the evidence before it and grant
summary judgment, despite the possibility of conflicting inferences. See
Killinger v. Twin Falls Highway District, 135 Idaho 322, 324, 17 P.3d 266, 268
(2000); Brown v. Perkins, 129 Idaho 189, 191, 923 P.2d 434, 436 (1996);
Riverside Dev. Co. v. Ritchie, 103 Idaho 515,519,640 P.2d 657,661 (1982).
The parties both moved for summary judgment centering on whether Total
American was an agent or a subcontractor, based on
interpretation
of the facts and law related to I.C. § 45-501 and the case was to be tried without a
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF-6

the district judge was free to resolve any conflicting inferences
arising from the facts presented. Review of the trial court's resolution of those
conflicting inferences is limited to whether the record is sufficient to support the
P.2d 1
1239
trial court's findings. Cameron v. Neal, 130 Idaho 898, 900,
(1997); Riverside, 103 Idaho at 520,650 P.2d at 662.
L & W Supply Corporation, 136 Idaho 738 at 742, 40 P.3d 96, 100 (2002). In the instant case,
the Respondents solely moved for summary judgment, with Appellant opposing entry of
summary judgment. Furthermore, included in the First Amended Complaint and the Maznik's
Answer both sides made a demand for trial by jury pursuant to I.R.C.P. 38(b). R. Vol 1, pp. 9,
16, 127, 135. Because there was no effective stipulation between the parties to establish that
there were no genuine issues of material fact existing, and because a jury was to be the trier of
fact in this case, the court was not in a position to resolve conflicting inferences arising from the
facts presented. The entry of summary judgment based on these procedural deficiencies was in
error and should be reversed.
III.

APPELLANT'S FACTUAL EVIDENCE SUPPORTING HER CLAIM FOR
PREMISES LIABILITY SHOULD HA VE BEEN SUBMITTED TO THE JURY.
In addition to the Statutory negligence per se claim, Appellant Bright also brought a

negligence claim against the Mazniks. The elements of negligence are well established: (1) duty;
(2) breach; (3) causation; and (4) damages. Black Canyon Racquetball Club, Inc. v. Idaho First
Nat'! Bank, NA., 119 Idaho 171, 175-76, 804 P.2d 900, 904-05 (1991). McPheters v. Maile, 138
Idaho 391, 64 P.3d 317 (2003).
In Boswell v. Steele, 158 Idaho 554, 348 P.3d 497, (Ct. App. 2015), the Court considered
the issue of an owner's premises liability for an unprovoked dog attack. Without determining
whether harboring a vicious dog was a condition or an activity on the land, the Court determined
that a property owner, with knowledge of an animal's dangerous propensities, who fails to warn
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damages from an unprovoked attack. The Court defined
as follows:

landowner owes an

reasonably safe condition or to warn

the

duty of property owners
to keep the premises in a

hidden or concealed dangers." Id at 562. Ultimately,

under the facts of the Boswell case, the homeowner was held liable for the unprovoked attack of
her terrier on an invitee who had been to the home on several occasions. The Court found her
liable despite the signs posted on her fence warning others to beware of the dog.
In this matter, Appellant provided evidence to establish that (1) the dog owners believed
the Dog to be intimidating (R. Vol I, p. 155); (2) that their closest neighbor, Janette Endecott,
had personally observed the Dog on several occasions and stated "the dog would bark wildly at
me and lunged hard against its leash toward me" and "[t]here was no question in my mind but
that this was a vicious dog" (R. Vol. I, 107; and (3) that Mr. Thomas had introduced himself to
his neighbor, and explained that the Dog "is not a friendly dog" (R. Vol. I, p. 106-107).
Furthermore, the Appellant provided specific factual evidence that the property owners Mazniks
knew or should have known that the Dog was vicious, including:
•

Mazniks through their agent, personally visited the home each month to pick up
the rent payment and therein observed the confining conditions of the large Dog
along with the wild barking and aggressive nature of the Dog. R. Vol. I, p. 167.

•

Mazniks worked solely through their property managing agent who admitted that
everything the agent knew or did was on behalf of Mazniks. R. Vol. I, p. 187.

•

Mazniks' property agent rents to nearly 90% pet owners in order to tap that
market. R. Vol. I., p. 68.

•

Mazniks entered a "Pet Agreement" with the dog owners in this case granting
permission to have a "Belgian Shepherd 40lbs." on the premises. R. Vol. I, p.
60.

•

Mazniks assumed a duty to screen out tenants with dogs of an aggressive breed.
R. Vol. I, p. 180.
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•

Mazniks failed through
agent's ordinary
to
the Belgian
Shepherd breed to find that it is a regularly used guard dog. A simple Internet
search would have revealed the aggressive nature of this breed. R. Vol. I, p. 174.

•

The Dog was confined to the small home with no dog run or kennel and no
socialization with others outside the home. R. Vol. I, pp. 154-155.

"When assessing a motion for summary judgment, all controverted facts are to be
liberally construed in favor of the nonmoving party. Furthermore, the trial court must draw all
reasonable inferences in favor of the party resisting the motion." G&M Farms v. Funk Irrigation
Co., 119 Idaho 514, 517, 808 P.2d 851, 854 (1991); Sanders v. Kuna Joint School Dist., 125
Idaho 872, 874, 876 P.2d 154, 156 (Ct. App. 1994). In this case, Appellant Bright presented to
the District Court the above detailed substantial competent evidence upon which a jury could
conclude that the property owners, Mazniks, knew or should have known of the vicious nature of
the dog. Bright asserts on appeal that the District Court erred in failing to acknowledge the
evidence on material issues of fact and failed to view those items of evidence in a light most
favorable to Appellant as the non-moving party.
IV.

THE HOLDING IN BOOTS v. WINTERS IS DISTINGUISHABLE.
The reliance of the District Court on the holding in Boots v. Winters, 145 Idaho 389, 179

P.3d 352 (Ct. App. 2008) for the proposition that a property owner has no premises liability for a
vicious dog is misplaced. The facts presented in Boots are distinguished from the present case.
In Boots, two brothers, ages 9 and 11, were walking to their school bus stop through an alley
abutting the fenced backyard of the residence rented to a dog owner. The evidence in that case
established that the younger brother had provoked the dog that was contained inside the fenced
yard by kicking the fence and swinging his jacket at the dog. When his jacket was then pulled
into the yard by the dog,

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF-9

older brother climbed inside

fence to retrieve the jacket and was

dog. The

brother ran

fenced yard to help

son,

to

mom to come help, and

too, was attacked and injured by the dog.

In Boots, the Court found that LC. 25-2805(2) does not create a duty on a landowner for
an attack by a vicious dog when the victim provoked the dog or trespassed on the property. The
Court could have simply determined that the dog in this circumstance did not meet the "vicious"
definition under the statute and it therefore did not apply. The Court then determined that that
the landlord did not owe a duty to third parties for the dog attack on the basis of collecting a pet
deposit and, further, that there was no evidence that the landlord regulated the size or type of the
dog that could be kept on the premises.
The Boots case differs substantially from the instant case on the essential element that the
dog in Boots was not found to be vicious under the Statute. Furthermore, the facts of the present
case show that not only did the Mazniks, through their agent, Ms. Neddo, evaluate the breed of
dogs allowed on the rental property, but actually had the opportunity to observe the dog's
demeanor and aggressiveness as the agent collected the rent directly from the tenants' home on a
regular monthly basis. Through the landlord's agent, the evidence is available to establish a
reasonable inference that the landlord had reason to know of this particular dog's aggressive
propensities and behaviors. Furthermore, the facts of this case clearly establish that the dog was
vicious under the statutory definition and the attack was not provoked and Ms. Bright was not a
trespasser.

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF-IO

THE DISTRICT COURT FAILED TO FOLLOW THE UNAMBIGUOUS
LANGUAGE OF I.C. § 25-2805(2).
Statutory Construction is Inappropriate when the Language of the Statute is
Clear and Unambiguous.
The District Court failed to look to the clear unambiguous language of the statute and
proceeded to interpret the statute to require an additional element, not present in the actual
statutory language, that before liability can attach, there must be a prior attack or some other
evidence of the dog's vicious propensities. The court followed the "one free bite" theory of
liability even through there is no language to that effect in the statute itself.
Where the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, statutory construction
is unnecessary, and this Court need only determine the application of the words to
the facts of the case. Hamilton v. Reeder Flying Serv., 135 Idaho 568, 572, 21
P.3d 890, 894 (2001). A statute is ambiguous where the language is reasonably
capable of more than one conflicting construction. Struhs v. Protection Techs.
Inc., 133 Idaho 715, 718, 992 P.2d 164, 167 (1999). However, ambiguity is not
established merely because differing interpretations are presented to a court;
otherwise, all statutes subject to litigation would be considered ambiguous."
Hamilton, 135 Idaho at 572, 21 P.3d at 894. Therefore, "[t]he interpretation
should begin with an examination of the literal words of the statute, and this
language should be given its plain, obvious, and rational meaning. " Williamson
v. City of McCall (In re Williamson), 135 Idaho 452, 455, 19 P.3d 766, 769
(2001).
L & W Supply Corporation, 136 Idaho 738, 742, 40 P.3d 96, 100.
In this case, the District Court erred in its interpretation of the statute as ambiguous and
should have refrained from engaging in statutory construction. LC. § 25-2805(2) establishes
liability for injuries caused by a vicious dog for the dog owner and the owner the premises on
which the animal is housed. The statute provides a clear definition of a vicious dog as "any dog,
which, when not physically provoked, physically attacks, wounds, bites or otherwise injures any
person who is not trespassing." Once the "vicious" definition is met, the statute provides that "it
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be

for the owner or

a

the owner

a

dog is present to

dog outside a secure enclosure.
§

-2805(2) clearly states that a property owner is responsible for the unprovoked

attack of an animal housed on his/her property. Further, the statute does not distinguish between
whether the property O\\Tier is a landlord or an owner occupying the property. The Statute
simply states the "owner of premises on which a vicious dog" is harbored.

Black's Law

Dictionary defines "harbor" as "[t]o afford lodging to, to shelter, or to give a refuge to." Black's
Law Dictionary, Fifth Edition (1979). Under the Statute, any vicious dog must be maintained in
a secured enclosure, from which it cannot escape. Further, the animal must be restrained before
it can be removed from the secured enclosure.
B.

I.C. § 25-2805(2) Establishes Liability Per Se.

In this matter, the Maznik Respondents argue that they had no duty to protect Ms. Bright
from an unprovoked attack. However, Idaho Code § 25-2805(2) imposes responsibility without
requiring an analysis of duty. Violation of the statute constitutes negligence per se. Idaho Code
§ 25-2805(2) imposes liability per se for failure to house a vicious dog in a secure and

inescapable enclosure. This liability is imposed on the property owner. This liability likewise
attaches on the first unprovoked attack. In other words, the Statute does not require that the
property owner have knowledge of prior attacks. The Mazniks, through their agent, knowingly
rented an insufficiently equipped unit to a tenant with two dogs. The Property had no fence,
kennel or dog run. Further, the Property had no screen doors that could have at a minimum
provided a protective barrier for invitees approaching the door to the Property. Furthermore, the
Mazniks have a standard policy to investigate the dog breeds of potential tenants and their
to
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to
on

to provide a secure

Property, while ,.,,,..,,.,,,,.._ to rent to a tenant with large breed dog known for its

propensities, created an environment ripe for an unprovoked attack to result in an

mJury. Under the Statute, the Mazniks must bear liability for the risk of their decision to rent an
ill-equipped premises to a tenant with a large breed dog known to react protectively.
C.

Ms. Bright was an Invitee Upon the Premises.

Respondents' argument in their Brief at page 18-21 that Ms. Bright was a "trespasser" on
the premises of the Landowner is unfounded. Respondents correctly identify the standards to
determine the status of the person injured on the land into three categories: invitee, licensee, or
trespasser. "An invitee is one who enters upon the premises of another for a purpose connected
with the business conducted on the land, or where it can reasonably be said that the visit may
confer a business, commercial, monetary or other tangible benefit to the landowner."
Holzheimber v. Johannesen, 125 Idaho 397, 299, 871 P.2d 814, 816 (1994). In the instant case,

Appellant Bright was present on the property to discuss a late payment due on an auto loan with
the tenant. She was there, specifically, to determine when payment could be expected in order to
prevent the need to repossess the tenant's personal vehicle which was security for a consensual
loan between the parties. Because this visit conferred a "business, commercial, monetary or
other tangible benefit" to the tenant, Ms. Bright meets the definition of an invitee.

The

remainder of Respondents' arguments with respect to their claim that Ms. Bright was a
trespasser, are outside of the scope of consideration in applying the statute. Any suggestion that
this nullifies Ms. Bright's claim of liability is meritless.

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF-13

The Statute Does
Civil Liability,

Require a Previous Dog Attack as a Prerequisite to

Court

that the Statute was ambiguous.

Furthermore, the court's process of interpreting the Statute in a manner in which to require the
additional element of prior knowledge of the animal's vicious tendencies as shown through a
prior attack is clearly at odds with the clear language of the Statute.
As noted in Respondents' Brief, LC. § 25-2805(2) was replaced with LC. § 25-2810 in
the 2016 legislative session. The new LC. § 25-2810 provides new terminology and definitions
for an "at-risk dog" and a "dangerous dog." The new Statute further clarifies that there is no
prerequisite of a previous attack by the dog in order for civil liability for damages to attach under
the Statute and now includes a provision that reads as follows: "A prior determination that a dog
is dangerous or at-risk, or subject to any court order imposing restrictions or requirements
pursuant to the provision of this section, shall not be a prerequisite to civil liability for injuries
caused by the dog." While this Statute was enacted after the instant case was commenced, it
does provide guidance and clarification that Idaho does not follow the "one free bite theory" for
imposing civil liability for injuries caused by a vicious dog.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, Ms. Bright respectfully requests that this Court reverse the
District Court's judgment dismissing Ms. Bright's Complaint as to Mr. and Mrs. Maznik and
order that the First Amended Complaint be allowed with a full trial on the issues of fact.
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